How Uniform Are The Uniform Anatomical Gift Acts?
“SECTION 11. PERSONS THAT MAY RECEIVE ANATOMICAL GIFT; PURPOSE OF ANATOMICAL GIFT”
Thus begins a very important section of a very important piece of legislation. Except it isn’t actually legislation at all, though it does look the part. It is the Revised Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (2006) [“UAGA”]. UAGA is model legislation, and in that form it does not have the force of law.
The model act continues:
(a) An anatomical gift may be made to the following persons named in the document of gift:
(1) a hospital; accredited medical school, dental school, college or university; organ procurement organization; or other appropriate person, for research or education;
Crucially, this section tells us under what, if any, authority we may direct that a cryonics service provider take custody of our bodies after legal death. Whether on plain meaning, or act-specific definition, cryonics service providers are not hospitals, medical or dental schools, colleges or universities. In some circumstances, Alcor and/or Suspended Animation behave like organ procurement organizations — insofar as brains are organs — but that term is defined in UAGA so as to require designation by the Secretary of the US Department of Health and Human Services. Subsection 2 (not reproduced above) is specific to organ transplantation, and subsection 3 pertains to eye banks and tissue banks, neither of which are good “homes” for a cryonics service provider.
So, for the time being we are left with “or other appropriate person, for research or education.” It isn’t much — but it’s home, and on that point at least one court agrees, namely the Court of Appeals of Iowa in Alcor Life Extension Foundation v Richardson.  But wait — how does a court in Iowa even begin to consider the meaning and effect of UAGA if it isn’t really law? Well, because the Iowa Legislature looked at the model uniform act, decided it liked it (mostly), and made it into state law. In fact, the Iowa Legislature made some changes to the model, but it left in the “other appropriate person” clause, and that is very good, because when Alcor sued Orville Richardson’s brother and sister for custody of Orville’s body, the Court of Appeals of Iowa agreed that Alcor was an “appropriate person for research” for the purposes of Iowa’s UAGA. 
Thus, we can see how important these words are. As the name implies, UAGA is an attempt to promote uniformity in an area of law which could otherwise vary considerably from state to state, making the procurement and transfer of life-saving organs and other tissues for transplant very difficult. So the Uniform Law Commission  came along and drafted UAGA for enactment in all states. Of course, this process is voluntary on the part of the states, and does not require wholesale adoption of the model act without modification — and that is where potential for trouble creeps in. Human cryopreservation is obviously not the intended subject of the act; even generally, gifts for research and education are only a secondary focus. In most states (Arizona being a conspicuous exception) there is no cryonics lobbyist at the table when state legislators are deliberating whether and how to enact the newest incarnation of UAGA; hence, they are not thinking about us or our unique interests when they consider whether to pass the model act with the words “or other appropriate person, for research or education” intact.
Now, section 24 of UAGA does state that “[i]n applying and construing this uniform act, consideration must be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that enact it.” But of course, the force of that section depends on whether or not it was itself legislated with the rest of the Act. However, assuming it was, this provision still cannot outweigh clear evidence of a legislature’s intent to diverge from the model by removing or materially altering particular language. That is to say, if the “other appropriate person” clause is left out of one state’s enactment of UAGA, a court has no discretion to read it in.  Where the uniformity provision does help is if Alcor ever has to go to court again in a state with a UAGA substantially similar to Iowa’s — then the Iowa case should carry significant persuasive force.  Happily, a majority of states’ UAGAs contain the “other appropriate person” clause, unaltered.  A few others have adopted different language that is equally or maybe even more applicable to cryonics organizations , and two states may even provide additional points of entry for cryonics service providers.  However, nine states present problematic aberrations from the mold. In Oklahoma, the State Anatomical Board gets to designate who is an “other appropriate person.”  Likewise, the Virginia Transplant Council is in charge of authorizing “other appropriate persons” in Virginia , and in the District of Columbia this is the domain of the mayor.  The remaining six states lack the “other appropriate person” clause entirely, and any other equivalent entry point: these are California, Florida, Maryland, New York, Texas, and Washington.  It is a little surprising to see some current (and in Texas’ case, future ) hubs of cryonics activity on this list.
At this stage, I feel I should point out that anatomical gift legislation is only one mechanism for making legal provisions for transference of custody of one’s body after legal death. The other (arguably more traditional) method is the “final disposition of human remains” method. Thus, the mere fact that a state’s anatomical gift legislation does not permit donations to cryonics organizations doesn’t rule out legally enforceable cryonics arrangements. The nine states mentioned above all have some statutory provision for the disposition of human remains route, though Florida stands out for lack of clarity. Maryland and Oklahoma both provide the right to direct the disposition of one’s body after death.  Written preferences are likewise binding in California, District of Columbia, New York, Texas, and Washington, which states also provide the right to designate a person who will supersede the spouse or next of kin’s default authority to control disposition (though they would be bound by the decedent’s written instructions in any case).  Virginia allows for designation in writing of a person who will control disposition (over a surviving spouse or other next of kin), but the relevant statute does not expressly state that the decedent’s instructions are binding — though it could be argued that it is implied. Florida’s statutes are not explicit as to who controls the disposition of human remains after death, nor whether written preferences of the deceased are legally binding, though case law has generally supported this result. 
However, even if the nine states whose anatomical gift statutes apparently preclude donation to cryonics organizations still provide legally enforceable final disposition rights, mightn’t a document that uses language around “anatomical donations” for this second purpose present somewhat of a red herring? For example, Alcor’s success in the Richardson case relied in part on the fact that Iowa’s UAGA takes precedence over its final disposition provisions, which would have favoured Orville’s brother and sister to control disposition.  But when an anatomical gift under UAGA fails for lack of a valid donee, the gift doesn’t fail, but passes instead “to the appropriate procurement organization” (which would not include the cryonics service provider). Would this aspect of UAGA prevail over the cryonicist’s clear intent, just because he or she used the words “anatomical donation”? This result seems inconceivably formalistic, but illustrates the (potential) problem with blending legal categories. On the other hand, because we cannot necessarily control which anatomical gift legislation will ultimately apply to us (as it will be the law of whichever jurisdiction we die in, whenever that happens to be), a hybrid, one-size-fits-most solution has clear utility.
As a Canadian, my interest in UAGA was actually initially focused north of the border. I noticed that Cryonics Institute’s standard issue emergency necklace has “UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT” on the back, and I wondered what Canadian medical personnel might make of that, since we have no such named legislation. However, the intent of CI’s “Uniform Donor Form”  is fairly clear, and the majority of Canadian provinces have broadly empowering legislation for making “human tissue gifts.”  This is especially good because English-Canadian common law never developed the deferential approach taken by US judges to decedents’ preferences for final disposition — such preferences were only ever considered morally binding on executors and next of kin, and not legally so.  However, Alberta’s Human Tissue and Organ Donation Act only permits body donations to university medical, dental or related health programs.  This limitation expressly refers to “a body donated under this Act” as opposed to “any tissue, organ or body donated under this Act,” so it could be argued that Alcor neuropatients may still be transferred using the anatomical gift mechanism — but this may not reflect the intent of legislature, and as such may not be a sustainable reading. Unfortunately, this would mean that Albertans (or at minimum, Albertan whole-body patients) are hit doubly — they have no legally binding mechanism for transfer of custody of their bodies to their cryonics organization under either the anatomical gift or final disposition route.
So, more than most, Albertan cryonicists might want to reconsider the wisdom of where they live. That said, while other readers may think themselves lucky to live in a state or province I didn’t mention, laws change , and I have just learned all-too-personally how many fifty states are to monitor. We must each be vigilant in ensuring our various cryonics legal documents are valid for their intended purposes.
1 785 NW (2d) 717 (Ill Ct App 2010).
2 Ibid at 725.
4 UAGA’s choice of law provision (section 19) states that a document of anatomical gift will be valid if it is executed in accordance with either (i) the law of the forum (i.e. the UAGA where the document is sought to be used), (ii) the law of the state/country where it was executed, or (iii) the law of the state/country where the person was domiciled, had a place of residence or was a national when the document was executed. However, the interpretation of the document of gift is governed by the forum law.That is to say, a document of anatomical gift to a cryonics service provider which is formally valid in the forum by merit of its validity under the laws of the state/country where it was executed, etc., may yet be ineffective under the laws of the forum.
5 The Richardson decision also included a tentative, but nonetheless authoritative finding that Orville’s payment to Alcor to preserve his body, and less-than-perfectly-altruistic motives did not move the transaction outside the legal category of “gift.” Again, this finding and the uniformity provision should go a long way to deciding the issue if it comes up again in another state.
6 For ease of reference: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Arizona, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming.
7 Minnesota replaces “other appropriate person” with “non-profit organization in medical education or research.” Minn Stat § 525A.10. Delaware, Illinois, and Pennsylvania still use language from older incarnations of the UAGA, which lack “other appropriate person” but define “any bank or storage facility” in such a way that so long as the cryonics service provider is recognized as a permissible donee in its home state, it should qualify under the Delaware/Illinois/Pennsylvania statutes. 16 Del Code § 2712, 755 ILCS § 50/5-10, 20 Pa C S § 8612.
8 Alcor’s own lobbying efforts resulted in the inclusion of the comparatively broadly defined “procurement organization” in Arizona’s ARS §36-850; Missouri has provision for “cadaver procurement organization[s]”. Mo Rev Stat § 194.255.
9 63 OS §2200.11A.
10 Va Code § 32.1-291.11
11 DC Code §7-1531.10.
12 Cal Health & Safety Code § 7150.50; Fla Stat § 765.513; Md Code, Est & T §4-509; NY PBH Law §4302; Texas Health & Safety Code § 692A.011; RCW § 68.64.100.
13 Comfort, Texas is home to the Timeship project.
14 Md Code, Health §5-509; 21 OS § 1151.
15 Cal Health & Safety Code §7100.1; DC Code §3-413; NY PBH Law §4201.2(c); Texas Health & Safety Code § 711.002; RCW § 68.50.160.
16 Va Code §54.1-2825.
17 Fla Stat § 497.005(37) sets out an apparent order of priority in a definitions section, without elsewhere stating that that priority grants any particular rights; § 732.804 uses permissive language instead of imperative. See also Leadingham v. Wallace, 691 So (2d) 1162 (Fla 5th DCA 1997).
18 Supra note 1 at 727.
19 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (2006), § 11(c)(4).
20 http://www.cryonics.org/documents/Uniform. html
21 These are largely derived from various iterations of the Uniform Human Tissue Gift Act proposed by the Uniform Law Conference of Canada.
22 Quebec and British Columbia are the only provinces which provide statutory rights to direct disposition of one’s own human remains: art 42 CCQ and Human Tissue Gift Act, RSBC 1996 c 211 s 4.
23 SA 2006 c H-14.5 s 3.
24 For example, the 2006 revision of UAGA was introduced in the Pennsylvania Legislature this year.
First published as a regular column called In Perpetuity in Cryonics Magazine, February 2013